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Abstract  
This study examines the impact and efficiency of the design of the Fair and 
Equitable Tobacco Reform Act of 2004 in deregulating the tobacco production industry.  
Results offer a number of policy implications of which deregulation of an economically 
challenged industry can be achieved without the use of taxpayer funds. 
 
Introduction 
For decades, the federal tobacco regulations administered under the 1938 
Agricultural Adjustment Act effectively protected tobacco growers from downward price 
adjustments resulting from surplus production and led to the development of valuable 
assets that belonged to tobacco producers; however, in recent years, these regulations 
artificially inflated the price of U.S. leaf tobacco relative to foreign tobacco causing 
demand for U.S. grown tobacco to decline.  The resulting loss of tobacco revenue led to 
calls by legislators from tobacco growing states to terminate the existing federal tobacco 
program. 
As Congress sought to deregulate the tobacco industry, two major issues surfaced.  
The first concerned the source of funds to facilitate the purchase of tobacco quotas owned 
by growers and the second involved the authority of the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) to regulate the content and marketing of tobacco products.  On each issue, the 
House and Senate took differing positions with the tobacco manufacturers generally 
favoring the House position to supply funds from the Treasury to purchase quotas and to 
not regulate the marketing and content of tobacco products.  The major dissention among 
manufacturers was on the issue of market and product regulation, which Philip Morris 
supported.  When the conference report was released, Congress had failed to give the 
FDA regulatory authority over the marketing and content of tobacco products; however, 
Congress determined that the settlement would be funded through an assessment on   3
tobacco manufacturers and importers; potentially erasing any gains to manufacturers 
from lower input prices.   
The final bill passed by Congress became the Fair and Equitable Tobacco Reform 
Act of 2004 and was signed into law on Oct. 22, 2004 as part of the Jobs Creation Act of 
2004 (H.R.4520).  This legislation resulted in the most significant change in tobacco 
policy in U.S. history and represents one of the most dramatic and rapid policy changes 
experienced by any agricultural commodity (Tiller et al., 2006). 
This study examines the effect of this legislation on the tobacco industry, as well 
as the efficiency of its design using standard market model-event study methodology.  
This research methodology has commonly been used in other disciplines [Ball and Brown 
(1968), Fama (1969), Rendleman, Jones and Latane (1982), Jensen and Ruback (1983), 
MacKinlay (1997), Ikenberry and Ramnath (2002), and Liljeblom (2006)].  The 
employment of this research methodology requires the identification of dates on which 
news announcements or events were unanticipated by market participants.  In this study, 
we identify three important dates in the legislative process of this law that were 
unanticipated by the market.  Two of these dates provide for a direct examination of the 
effect of the key elements of the law and the overall efficiency of its design. 
On the first of these dates, June 14, 2004, the U.S. House of Representatives 
added the quota buyout provision to its corporate tax bill, effectively ensuring an end to 
the tobacco quota system.  The elimination of this means of production control was 
designed to create a competitive market structure, increase efficiency, and drive down the 
price of domestically produced tobacco leaves.  As a result, tobacco manufacturers would 
benefit from reduced input costs leading to an increase in expected future earnings.     4
After the House passed its version of this bill, the U.S. Senate passed its own 
version, which differed substantially.  These bills then went to Conference Committee for 
reconciliation, and, on October 6, 2004, the Conference Committee released its report.  
The Conference report contained the elimination of the tobacco quota system and denied 
the FDA the regulatory authority it sought over tobacco products; however, unlike the 
House version of the bill, it required tobacco manufacturers and importers to fund the 
purchase of tobacco quotas.  As a result, the future benefits derived by tobacco 
manufacturers from lower input prices were, to some degree, offset by the quota funding 
requirements, and U.S. taxpayers were relieved of the burden to fund the purchase of 
tobacco quotas.   
Following the passage of the Fair and Equitable Tobacco Reform Act of 2004, 
President Bush, in an unexpected move before the 2004 Presidential election, signed the 
bill into law on October 22, 2004.  This move by President Bush put an end to a hotly 
debated political issue and ended any remaining uncertainty concerning the deregulation 
of the tobacco industry. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  The next section presents the 
hypothesis tested to assess the effect of the legislation on the tobacco industry.  Section 
III presents the event study methodology.  Section IV presents the descriptive statistics 
and empirical results of the hypotheses testing.  Finally, conclusions and implications 
would be presented. 
   5
Background and Hypothesis Development 
  The Fair and Equitable Tobacco Reform Act of 2004 permanently and 
significantly altered the production and marketing of US tobacco by eliminating tobacco 
quota assets and tobacco price supports and by removing geographical restrictions on the 
production of tobacco.  The elimination of tobacco quotas would allow producers to grow 
sufficient amounts of tobacco to meet market demand, while the removal of geographical 
restrictions on the production of tobacco would allow the means of production to flow 
into geographical regions that can produce tobacco more efficiently.  In addition, the 
removal of the price support program would allow domestic leaf prices to settle at a 
price-level that the market could support.  These measures, taken together, would result 
in lower input prices for tobacco manufacturers and would likely increase earnings for 
those manufacturers. 
  As the House considered legislation concerning the tobacco industry, it 
introduced measures to eliminate the federal tobacco program instituted under the 1938 
Agricultural Adjustment Act on June 14, 2004.  While this idea had been bantered about 
in Congress prior to this date, the tobacco industry had not expected it to be added to the 
legislation under consideration.  As a result, we develop the following hypothesis: 
H1:  Inclusion of legislative measures to eliminate the federal tobacco program on June 
14, 2004 resulted in positive, significant returns accruing to shareholders of tobacco 
manufacturers. 
 
  When the House introduced the elimination of the federal tobacco program, it 
proposed that Treasury would supply the necessary funds to purchase tobacco quotas and 
to provide transitional payments to active tobacco producers.  The Senate, likewise, 
agreed to the elimination of the federal tobacco program, but it proposed that tobacco   6
manufacturers and importers would provide the funds required to accomplish this 
purpose.  In addition, the Senate additionally proposed that the FDA be allowed 
regulatory authority over the marketing and content of tobacco products.  While the 
Senate’s proposals were, overall, less favorable to tobacco manufacturers, the final 
outcome was uncertain until the Conference Committee released its report on October 6, 
2004.  On this date, it became known that tobacco manufacturers and importers would be 
required to provide $9.6 billion in funding to pay for the purchase of tobacco quotas and 
to provide for transition payments to active producers.  On the other hand, the FDA was 
denied regulatory authority over the marketing and content of tobacco products.  While 
the exclusion of this proposal from the final bill benefited most tobacco manufacturers, it 
did not alter the regulatory environment in which tobacco manufacturers operated and, 
thus, had little impact on future earnings.  The requirement for manufacturers to fund the 
elimination of the federal tobacco program would, however, cost firms real dollars and, 
therefore, negatively affect future earnings.  As a result, we develop the following 
hypothesis: 
H2:  The release of the conference report denying the FDA regulatory authority over the 
content and marketing of tobacco products and requiring tobacco manufacturers and 
importers to fund the elimination of the federal tobacco program on October 6, 2004 
resulted in negative, significant returns accruing to shareholders of tobacco 
manufacturers. 
 
  The deregulation of the tobacco industry became a politically charged issue 
during the tightly contested Presidential campaign of 2004.  As a result, the Jobs Creation 
Act of 2004, which contained the Fair and Equitable Tobacco Reform Act of 2004, was 
expected to remain on the desk of President Bush until after the conclusion of the 
Presidential race.  However, in a somewhat politically risky move, President Bush signed   7
the bill into law on October 22, 2004.  The signing of this bill codified into law the 
deregulation of the tobacco industry and cemented the responsibility of tobacco 
manufacturers in this process.  Overall, this finalized what was seen as a positive 
development to the tobacco industry; however, it provides little additional information 
that would impact shareholder value.  As a result, we develop the following hypothesis 
(stated in null form): 
H3:  The unexpected signing of the Fair and Equitable Tobacco Reform Act of 2004 by 
President Bush did not result in significant returns accruing to shareholders of tobacco 
manufacturers. 
 
  The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 had, for decades, limited the free 
market adjustments of both tobacco prices and supplies.  The full effect of these market 
restrictions, however, was not felt until the quality of foreign produced tobacco 
improved, and manufacturers began to substitute it for domestically produced tobacco.  
This led to declining demand for U.S. tobacco and declining revenues for producers.  In 
order to correct this problem, Congress eliminated the market restrictions imposed by the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938.  This, in theory, would benefit tobacco 
manufacturers by lowering input prices; however, as part of its legislative efforts, 
Congress required tobacco manufacturers and importers to fund the elimination of the 
tobacco quota system.  In essence, Congress had determined that the tobacco industry 
was to fund its own deregulation.  As a result, the efficiency of the design of the Fair and 
Equitable Tobacco Reform Act of 2004 depended on whether or not the cost borne by the 
tobacco manufacturers and importers outweighed the potential benefits derived from 
lower input prices.  Therefore, the design of the final piece of legislation should neither   8
be onerous nor provide excessive benefits to tobacco manufacturers.  Based on this 
discussion, we develop our final hypothesis, in the null form: 
H4:  The sum of the market reaction to events in the legislative process of the Fair and 
Equitable Tobacco Reform Act of 2004 will be approximately equal to zero. 
 
Methodology 
  Event study methodology is widely used in financial economics and provides a 
useful means of examining the actual effect of new legislation on a group of firms or, in 
this case, a particular industry by measuring the impact of the new legislation on the 
value of firms composing the group or industry.
1  This methodology is predicated upon 
the efficient markets hypothesis, which posits that all available information is impounded 
in current stock prices, and the relation between the value of a firm, as measured by its 
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where di,t+k is the expected future cash flow to firm i at time t+k, and r is the discount 
rate.  Under the efficient markets hypothesis, the value of firm i changes as the result of 
unexpected events related to the development, passage, or implementation of legislation 
that causes investors to revise estimates of future cash flows and/or the riskiness of those 
cash flows.   
In order to examine the effect of these unexpected events on firm value, the stock 
price both before and after revisions to estimates of future cash flows and/or the discount 
rate must be determined.  These prices, however, cannot both be measured at the same 
time; therefore, stock returns, defined as: 
                                                 
1 For a more thorough explanation of event study methodology please refer to Schwert (1981), MacKinlay 
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must be compared to a measure of normal returns that would have been expected in the 
absence of the unexpected legislative developments in order to estimate their actual 
impact on the firm.  The difference between actual and normal returns, known as 
abnormal returns, measures the change in price after the legislative development relative 
to that before.  The abnormal returns were calculated for three event dates and nine 
tobacco companies listed in Panel A and B of Table 1, respectively.  
      Insert Table 1 
  We calculated normal returns using the market model: 
  Ri,t=αi+βiRm,t+ei,t                (3) 
where Rm,t is the equal-weighted return on a portfolio of all marketable securities at time t 
and ei,t is the error term for firm i at time t and has an expected value of zero and a 
variance equal s ei
2.  Estimating equation (3) over the period extending from 255 days 
from 21 days before the event provides the out of sample estimate of normal returns for 
firm i.  Comparing these with the actual returns of firm i provides a measure of abnormal 
returns, which, based on the efficient markets hypothesis, are the result of unexpected 
events impacting the value of firm i.  This can be represented by the expression: 
  ARi,t=Ri,t-(αi+βiRm,t)                (4) 
where ARi,t is the abnormal return for firm i at time t and is equal to ei,t.   
Under the null hypothesis that the events under consideration do not impact 
returns, ARi,t, conditional on event window market returns, is joint normally distributed 
and has a conditional mean of zero and a conditional variance σ






























.            (5) 
From equation (5), σ
2(ARi,t) has two separate components; the first being the variance 
from equation (3) and the second being additional variance due to sampling error in αi 
and βi.  This sampling error results in abnormal returns being serially correlated; 
however, as L, the number of days in the estimation window, becomes large, the second 
component approaches zero and σ
2(ARi,t) becomes s ei
2, allowing abnormal return 
observations to become independent over time.  Thus, the sampling distribution of an 
abnormal return observation is: 
  ARi,t~N(0, σ
2(ARi,t)).                (6) 
  In order to make inferences about each event date, abnormal returns must be 
aggregated across both the days in the event window, which in this case is the three-day 
period beginning the day of the event and ending two days after the event, and across 
firms.  We begin by obtaining the cumulative abnormal return, CARi(T1, T2), for each 
firm i across the event period (T1, T2): 
CAR T T AR i i t
t T
T
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Asymptotically, as L increases, the variance of CARi(T1, T2) is: 
  σ
2(T1, T2)=( T2- T1+1)s ei
2,              (8) 
thus, under the null hypothesis, cumulative abnormal returns have the distribution: 
  CARi(T1, T2)~N(0, σ
2(T1, T2)).             (9) 
The distribution in (9) allows for tests of the null hypothesis to be conducted; 
however, tests involving only one firm are not likely to be useful and, therefore, the   11
cumulative abnormal returns for each event period must be aggregated across firms.  
Aggregating these cumulative abnormal returns across N firms yields the average 
cumulative abnormal return for each event date, CAR T T
___
( , ) 1 2 , defined as: 
CAR T T
N
CAR T T i
i
N ___
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with variance: 
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Inferences can now be drawn about the cumulative abnormal returns for each event 
period using: 
  CAR T T
___
( , ) 1 2 ~N[0,s
2
1 2 ( ( , ))
___
CAR T T ]           (12) 
to test the null hypothesis that cumulative abnormal returns are zero for each event date.  
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This result is asymptotic with respect to both the number of securities, N, and the length 
of the estimation window, L. 
  The design of our study, however, introduces the possibility that event-induced 
variance exists.  This is due to the fact that our sample firms all belong to the same 
industry and that the event dates are common across the firms.  As a result, we use the 
standardized cross-sectional Z test developed by Boehmer, et al. (1991) to test the null 
hypothesis that average abnormal performance is equal to zero. 
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Empirical Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics, as of 2004, for the nine tobacco companies 
included in our study.  Total assets range in size from $69.5 million to $101.65 billion, 
with vast differences existing between firms within this range.  Total sales, likewise, 
broadly range from $30.6 million to $65.6 billion; however, the seven smallest firms, 
based on assets, range between $30.6 million and $6.44 billion, while the two largest 
firms had total sales of $63.96 billion and $65.63 billion.  The profitability of tobacco 
manufacturers in 2004 was generally strong, with reported earnings per share for the 
seven most profitable firms ranging between $1.45 per share and $5.62 per share.  
Overall, these descriptive statistics indicate vast differences between tobacco 
manufacturers with Philip Morris/Altria Group, Inc. possessing a substantial advantage in 
available resources over its competitors both individually and in aggregate.  Such 
indicates that Philip Morris/Altria Group, Inc. may have possessed the greatest ability to 
influence the legislative process, even though Congress sided with the other 
manufacturers on the issue of FDA regulation. 
Insert Table 2 
Impacts on the Tobacco Industry 
Column 2 of Table 3 presents the mean abnormal return of the tobacco industry 
on each of the eleven trading days surrounding our first event date, June 14, 2004.
2  Our 
results indicate that the market reacted favorably to the addition of the tobacco quota 
buyout to the House corporate tax bill, posting significant, positive abnormal gains on the 
                                                 
2 In Columns 2-4 of Table 3, trading day 0 is our event date.  Consequently, we present the mean abnormal 
return for the 5 trading days preceding the event date (t=-5 through t=-1) and the 5 trading days subsequent 
to the event date (t=+1 through t=+5).   13
post-event trading days t=+2 and t=+4 (1.10% and 0.61%, respectively).  In addition, the 
generalized sign test (not presented) indicates that tobacco manufacturers were more 
likely to have positive abnormal returns on the post-event trading days t=+2 and t=+4, as 
well as the event date itself (t=0, abnormal return is 0.51%, but is insignificant).
3  
Moreover, our results indicate that the market reacted in a significant, negative manner 
on the trading day prior to our event date (t=-1, abnormal return is -0.22%) and the 
market reacted in an insignificant manner on the individual trading days t=-5 through t=-
2.   This final result further indicates that the addition of the quota buyout provision to the 
corporate tax bill in the House was unexpected.  Overall, these results indicate initial 
support for our first hypothesis. 
Insert Table 3 
Column 3 of Table 3 presents the mean abnormal return of the tobacco industry 
for the eleven trading days surrounding our second event date, October 6, 2004.  Our 
results indicate that the market reacted in a negative manner to the release of the 
conference report that required tobacco manufacturers and importers to fund the 
deregulation of the tobacco industry.  On both the event date (t=0) and the subsequent 
date (t=+1), significant, positive abnormal gains accrued to shareholders of tobacco 
manufacturers (-1.10% and 0.99%, respectively).  On none of the five trading days 
preceding the event date did the market experience significant abnormal returns.  The 
only other trading day on which the market posted a significant abnormal return was on 
trading day t=+5, when the market experienced a significant, positive abnormal return of 
                                                 
3 The generalized sign test is used to compare the percentage of positive abnormal returns to the percentage 
of negative abnormal returns during the estimation period.  The null hypothesis in this test is that the 
percent of positive returns in the estimation period is equal to the percent of negative returns in the 
estimation period.   14
0.13%.  These results, similar to our first event, suggest that the event was unanticipated 
by the market, and, overall, our results indicate initial support for our second hypothesis.  
Column 4 of Table 3 presents the mean abnormal return of the tobacco industry 
on each of the eleven days surrounding our third event date, October 22, 2004.  Our 
results indicate that positive, significant abnormal returns were posted on trading days 
t=+3 and t=+4 and that negative, significant abnormal returns were posted on trading day 
t=-4; however, no significant abnormal returns accrued to shareholders on any other 
trading day surrounding our event date.  In particular, the reported abnormal returns on 
each of the individual trading days t=0 through t=+2 were insignificant and mixed in 
sign.  Similar to the results presented for our first two event dates, the abnormal returns 
on the individual dates prior to our third event date suggest that it was unanticipated.  In 
addition, our results indicate a lack of support for the rejection of our third hypothesis, 
stated in the null. 
Table 4 presents the cumulative average abnormal return for each of our three 
event dates and the corresponding cross-sectional Z-values.  Our results indicate that the 
tobacco manufacturing industry experienced a significant, positive abnormal return of 
2.32% (p-value = 0.074, two-tailed) during the three-day event window (0,+2) 
surrounding our first event date and that the tobacco manufacturing industry posted a 
significant, negative abnormal return of 2.00% (p-value < 0.01, two-tailed) during the 
three-day event window (0,+2) surrounding our second event date.  These results suggest 
support for our first two hypotheses.  Our results for the three-day event window (0,+2) 
surrounding our third event date, however, do not indicate the presence of significant   15
abnormal returns (p-value = 0.074, two-tailed), suggesting that our third hypothesis 
cannot be rejected. 
Insert Table 4 
Overall, our results indicate that returning the tobacco industry to a market in 
which the fundamental principles of economics are allowed to work benefited the 
industry as a whole.  These benefits are derived from allowing market supplies to adjust, 
unimpeded, to existing market demand at market clearing prices, while allowing 
production resources to flow to geographic areas where the production of tobacco is most 
efficient.  Our results further suggest that Congress understood that tobacco 
manufacturers would benefit from this return to a free market environment and, as a 
result, determined that tobacco manufacturers and importers, rather than taxpayers, would 
fund the deregulation of the tobacco industry.  Given the lack of significant abnormal 
returns surrounding the signing of the bill into law, a comparison of the positive, 
significant returns surrounding the first event and the negative, significant returns 
surrounding the second event suggests that Congress designed the bill in such a manner 
as to “use up” most of the benefits derived from deregulation to pay for the deregulation 
itself.  As a result, the design of this bill could be categorized not only as being efficient 
but also equitable to the tobacco industry and the U.S. taxpayer alike. 
Conclusion 
The study assessed the impact on the tobacco industry of the Fair and Equitable 
Tobacco Reform Act of 2004 and the efficiency of its design using standard market 
model-event study methodology.  Our results indicate that the tobacco industry benefited 
from the House of Representatives adding provisions to its corporate tax bill to eliminate   16
the regulation of the production and sale of U.S. tobacco.  Our results further indicate that 
the tobacco industry suffered significant, negative abnormal returns when the House and 
Senate released its conference report, which required tobacco manufacturers to fund the 
deregulation of the tobacco industry.  A comparison of these results further suggests that 
Congress was able to take advantage of the economic benefits of deregulation to require 
the tobacco industry, rather than taxpayers, to fund the deregulation.  This comparison 
also indicates that the funding requirements placed on manufacturers and importers was 
not onerous in nature, but rather approached, in magnitude, the economic benefits 
expected to be realized by tobacco manufacturers from the deregulation itself.   
This study’s results offer a number of research and regulatory implications.  
While most of the literature concerning the Fair and Equitable Tobacco Reform Act of 
2004 has concentrated on the implementation of the Act, our study is the first to explore 
the effect that the implementation of this Act will have on the tobacco industry; 
suggesting that the Act’s implementation was an economically neutral event.  Secondly, 
our study introduces the event study methodology that has commonly been used in 
financial economics to agricultural economics literature.  Finally, our study suggests that 
returning product markets to their original state, where the fundamental principles of 
economics are allowed to work freely, is beneficial and can be achieved without the use 
of taxpayer funds.   17
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Table 1 Tobacco Companies and Description of Events that Led to the Fair and Equitable  
Tobacco Reform Act of 2004 
 
Firms  Event 
Number  
Information Event and Date 
Philip Morris/Altria Group Inc  E1  Tobacco buyout was added to the House 
corporate tax bill (HR 4520) on the 14
th of 
June, 2004  British American Tobacco Plc 
RJR/Reynolds American  E2  The congressional conference committee 
agreement report was released on the 6
th of 
October, 2004  Imperial Tobacco Group Plc 
Gallaher Group Plc 
Loews Corp  E3  President Bush signed the bill into law on 
the 22
nd of October, 2004 
US Smokeless Tobacco Inc 
Vector Group Ltd 
Star Scientific Inc 
   19
Table 2 Descriptive Statistics on Tobacco Companies  








Philip Morris/Altria Group Inc  101,648.00  63,963.00  9,416.00  4.57 
British American Tobacco Plc  33,867.22  65,632.58  387.03  1.45 
RJR/Reynolds American  14,428.00  6,437.00  688.00  5.62 
Imperial Tobacco Group Plc  11,630.06  5,484.89  805.01  2.21 
Gallaher Group Plc  7,867.10  4,885.80  555.64  4.40 
Loews Corp  2,778.20  3,347.80  545.90  3.15 
US Smokless Tobacco Inc  1,659.48  1,788.95  530.84  3.23 
Vector Group Ltd  535.90  323.19  6.73  0.10 
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Table 3 
Mean Abnormal Returns on Individual Trading Days Surrounding Each Event Date in the 
Legislative Process of the Fair and Equitable Tobacco Reform Act of 2004. 
 
Day 0 = Day 0 = Day 0 =
Trading Day June 14, 2004 October 6, 2004 October 22, 2004
-5 0.68% -0.03% 0.43%
-4 0.10% 0.41% -0.81% ***
-3 0.24% 0.07% 0.09%
-2 -0.46% -0.55% 0.11%
-1 -0.22% * 0.22% -0.66%
0 0.51% -1.10% *** 0.66%
1 0.72% -0.99% *** -0.18%
2 1.10% *** 0.09% 0.23%
3 0.66% 0.40% 0.47% ***
4 0.62% ** -0.06% 1.22% ***





*,**,*** Significant at the .1, .05, and .01 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. 
 
Notes: 
Market Model Using Equally Weighted Market:  t i t m i i t i e R R , , , + + = b a  where  t i R ,  is the actual return on 
the stock of firm i  on day  t ;  t m R ,  is the CRSP equally weighted market return on day t  and  t i e , is the 
error term for firm i  on day t  varying independently of the market return ( ) t m R ,  and has an expected 
value of zero  ( ) 0 , = t i e E and a variance equal to  ( )
2
, t e t i e Var s = . 
( ) t m i i t i t i R R AR , , , ˆ ˆ b a + - =  where  t i AR ,  is the abnormal return for firm i at time t . 
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Table 4 
Mean Abnormal Returns for the Three-Day Post-Event Window, Including the Event Date, for Each 
Event Date in the Legislative Process of the Fair and Equitable Tobacco Reform Act of 2004. 
 
Cumulative Average
Event Date Abnormal Return Z-value
June 14, 2004 2.32% 1.787 *
October 6, 2004 -2.00% -9.010 ***
October 22, 2004 0.71% 0.915  
 
_________________________ 
*,**,*** Significant at the .1, .05, and .01 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. 
 
Notes: 
Market Model Using Equally Weighted Market:  t i t m i i t i e R R , , , + + = b a  where  t i R ,  is the actual return on 
the stock of firm i  on day  t ;  t m R ,  is the CRSP equally weighted market return on day t  and  t i e , is the 
error term for firm i  on day t  varying independently of the market return ( ) t m R ,  and has an expected 
value of zero  ( ) 0 , = t i e E and a variance equal to  ( )
2
, t e t i e Var s = . 
( ) t m i i t i t i R R AR , , , ˆ ˆ b a + - =  where  t i AR ,  is the abnormal return for firm i at time t . 
 